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Chairperson:  Andrew E. Monroe 
 
 
 Moral judgments arise from a consideration of both mental state inferences and an 
assessment of the outcomes of a moral event. Perspective taking and empathizing with 
people involved in a moral situation were predicted to differentially influence moral 
judgments. Perspective taking was predicted to guide observers to focus on the mental states 
of an agent, whereas empathy was predicted to guide observers to be more sensitive to the 
outcomes of an event and who is harmed or benefitted by the actions of a moral agent. In 
turn, perspective taking would intensify moral judgments of blame and praise for outcomes 
that were produced intentionally, and empathizing would intensify moral judgments for 
accidental actions. Two studies manipulated information about an agent’s mental state and 
event outcomes by having participants read vignettes that described accidental or attempted 
blameworthy and praiseworthy events. Participants were instructed to either take the 
perspective of or empathize with the people in the story and make judgments of blame and 
praise. Study 1 examined judgments of blame and Study 2 attempted to replicate and extend 
Study 1 by including praiseworthy vignettes. Together, the studies yielded mixed results. 
 
 v 
Empathizing was found to produce greater judgments of blame for accidental actions. Moral 
judgments of attempted acts did not robustly differ across instruction conditions.  
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Abstract 
 
 Moral judgments arise from a consideration of both mental state inferences and an 
assessment of the outcomes of a moral event. Perspective taking and empathizing with 
people involved in a moral situation were predicted to differentially influence moral 
judgments. Perspective taking was predicted to guide observers to focus on the mental states 
of an agent, whereas empathy was predicted to guide observers to be more sensitive to the 
outcomes of an event and who is harmed or benefitted by the actions of a moral agent. In 
turn, perspective taking would intensify moral judgments of blame and praise for outcomes 
that were produced intentionally, and empathizing would intensify moral judgments for 
accidental actions. Two studies manipulated information about an agent’s mental state and 
event outcomes by having participants read vignettes that described accidental or attempted 
blameworthy and praiseworthy events. Participants were instructed to either take the 
perspective of or empathize with the people in the story and make judgments of blame and 
praise. Study 1 examined judgments of blame and Study 2 attempted to replicate and extend 
Study 1 by including praiseworthy vignettes. Together, the studies yielded mixed results. 
Empathizing was found to produce greater judgments of blame for accidental actions. Moral 
judgments of attempted acts did not robustly differ across instruction conditions.  
Keywords: moral judgment, mental state inference, perspective taking, empathy 
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The Effects of Perspective Taking and Empathy on Moral Judgments of Blame and Praise  
Moral judgment and blame, in particular, may be one of the oldest tools for social 
regulation. Blame highlights a community’s values and social norms, as well as establishes 
boundaries for cooperative social behavior.  Blaming persons that harm others or disrupt the 
flow of communal life discourages future undesirable behavior (Malle & Bennett, 2002; 
Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014) and may even promote cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 
2002). Past research has proposed that people have a natural inclination to blame culpable 
agents (Alicke, 2000). Blame, however, is a complex social act and making moral judgments 
of blame requires integrating information about moral events (e.g., the severity of harm; the 
social meaning of that act) and agent’s mental states—what the person intended, wanted, or 
knew when she acted.   
There are many competing theories regarding how people make moral judgments. 
Most models agree, however, that moral judgments rely on a combination of inferences about 
the severity of an event’s outcome and the agent’s mental states (Cushman, 2008). Event 
evaluation involves assessing the amount of harm or suffering inflicted on a victim, whereas 
evaluation of mental state inferences involves attempting to understand an agent’s intentions, 
beliefs, and desires. The present investigation examines how a heightened focus on either of 
these factors can modify moral judgments of praise and blame. Specifically, I examine 
whether empathy and perspective taking guide perceivers’ attention differently to an event’s 
outcome or to an agent’s mental states.  Below, I review research on the process of making 
blame judgments, focusing on The Path Model of Blame (Malle et al., 2014). I then outline 
how empathy and perspective taking might affect this process by directing perceivers’ 
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attention to events versus mental states, and lastly, I review past literature to draw potential 
distinctions between moral judgments of blame and praise.   
The Process of Blame 
The Path Model of Blame describes the information processing steps involved in 
making a blame judgment.  The model suggests that the process of blame begins by detecting 
and evaluating a morally-relevant norm violation (e.g., a slain body on the ground, a dented 
car door, or a bruised and crying child). Following event detection, moral perceivers search 
for a responsible causal agent. For example, once a person sees that their car door is horribly 
dented, he or she is motivated to find out who or what caused the dent: Was it a careless 
person or falling stones from a nearby hillside? If the event was caused by a non-agent (e.g., 
windblown rocks), the process ends—people may be angry, but they do not blame rocks or 
the wind. If, however, the event was caused by an agent, then perceivers attempt to determine 
whether the behavior was intentional (i.e., dented the door on purpose) or unintentional 
(Malle & Holbrook, 2012). If the act was intentional, then perceivers seek information about 
the agent’s reasons (e.g., motives, desire, plans or beliefs), and if the behavior was 
unintentional, perceivers consider whether the agent could have or should have prevented the 
harmful event. 
Whereas the Path Model offers a detailed account of how perceivers process specific 
pieces of morally relevant information, one could break this process into two broad, principal 
steps: (1) detecting and evaluating events (the Event stage of the model) and (2) attending to 
the causal and mental contributions of an agent (the Intentionality, Reasons, Obligation, and 
Preventability stages of the model). The following sections go on to explain in detail these 
important contributing elements.  
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Events Powerfully Shape Moral Judgments  
The detection of norm-violating events initiates the moral judgment process (Malle et 
al., 2014)  and motivates perceivers to find the cause of a norm-violating event (Malle, 2004; 
Mikhail, 2007).  In some cases, event detection may be quite sparse—noticing that an object 
is broken or damaged—whereas, in other cases, events may provide a rich tapestry of 
information (e.g., a man holding a smoking gun over a victim). Additionally, what counts as 
a norm violation will vary widely based on perceivers’ values, culture, and social norms 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Regardless of how people define moral 
violations, detecting a moral violation is usually accompanied by an initial evaluative 
response (e.g., anger) based on the amount of harm inflicted. Indeed, some researchers 
consider such evaluative responses to be the primary motivating force behind moral 
judgments (Alicke, 2000; Haidt, 2001; Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004).  For example, 
Alicke and colleagues show that event severity (i.e., the amount of harm inflicted on a 
victim) influences people’s perceptions of causality (Alicke, 1992) intentions (Alicke, 
Weigold, & Rogers, 1990), and preventability (Mazzocco et al., 2004). Specifically, when 
events are more severe people believe agents were more causal, had worse intentions, and 
were more able to prevent bad events (i.e., were more negligent) compared to less severe 
events.  
Other moral theorists place a similar emphasis on the importance of events for moral 
judgment. Haidt (2001) proposes that perceiving a moral event (e.g., someone cleaning a 
toilet with the American flag) triggers an immediate, intuitive moral judgment (e.g., that’s 
wrong!). Knobe (2003; 2010) echoes this perspective, suggesting that moral judgments are 
intuitive and that the morality of events (their goodness or badness) biases people’s 
THE EFFECTS OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND EMPATHY  
 
 
 
6 
perceptions of the social world including causality (Knobe & Fraser, 2008), intentionality 
(Knobe, 2004), and even freedom (Phillips & Knobe, 2009).  
Together these theoretical perspectives highlight the importance of how people 
perceive and evaluate moral events for subsequent moral judgments. However, events alone 
often do not provide sufficient information to make a judgment. For example, if one were 
judging a person on the basis of events alone, then a woman who shoots a former lover for 
threatening her children would have to be appraised identically to a woman who shoots a 
former lover out of selfish jealously. Most people would agree that even though the events 
are identical (a man is killed in both cases), the two women deserve different amounts of 
blame because of their mental states. Thus, inferring the mental states of others is a 
complementary and necessary process for making moral judgments. 
Mental State Inferences are Central to Explaining Moral Events  
Whereas event-focused models of blame provide useful information about the process 
of moral judgment, attending to events ignores some of the important information 
influencing people’s moral judgments. Understanding the motives, desire, and beliefs of 
others is critical for accurately assessing moral events. For example, Gray and Wegner 
(2008) demonstrate that people experience an electrical shock delivered by a partner as more 
painful if the partner intentionally delivered the shock compared to doing so accidentally.  
Similarly, Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, and Lawrence (2004) show that even for positive 
events, people’s judgments of others depend on the actor’s motives.  In this experiment, 
researchers asked participants to evaluate a scenario where a professor dropped a stack of 
books he was carrying, and a student went out of her way to help him (a clearly morally 
praiseworthy act).  In this study, Reeder manipulated the motives of the student such that in 
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one condition the student was motivated by a desire to be helpful, whereas in another 
condition the student was motivated by a desire to ‘suck up’ in order to win an award the 
professor was handing out later.  This manipulation of the student’s mental states 
fundamentally changed participants’ judgments of the student’s moral character—they rated 
her as a good moral person in the case where she acted out of a desire to be helpful, but 
participants rated the student as being immoral when she acted out of nefarious self-interest. 
Thus, mental state inferences, independent of events, play a critical role in how people make 
their moral judgments. 
In a recent paper, Cushman (2008) demonstrates how mental state and event 
information come together in the moral judgment process. In his studies, participants were 
presented with a set of vignettes that manipulated an agent’s beliefs about an event and 
manipulated the outcome (whether or not harm was caused by the agent). Participants were 
then asked about how much blame and punishment the agent deserved, alongside questions 
about how wrong and permissible the behavior was. Cushman (2008) showed that people 
strongly differentiated between attempted harm (where an agent fails to cause harm but has 
malicious intentions/motives), and accidental harm (where an agent causes harm but has 
innocent intentions/motives). People blame attempted harm more harshly than accidental 
harm, showing that perceivers place a premium on a person’s mental states, while still 
attending to events.  Additionally, Cushman (2008) demonstrated that different moral 
judgments differentially rely on mental state versus event information. Judgments of 
wrongness and permissibility were primarily driven by the mental states of the agent, 
specifically, beliefs and desires. By contrast, judgments of blame and punishment responded 
to both mental states and events. 
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Similarly, recent work with fMRI further highlights the distinction between events 
and mental states, as well as the central contribution of mental state inferences to moral 
judgments. The right temporal parietal junction (RTPJ) is identified as a key area implicated 
in the integration of outcome and belief information for making moral judgments.  Higher 
activation in this region was predictive of using mental state information (above outcome 
information) to make a moral judgment (Young & Saxe, 2008; Young & Saxe, 2009). 
Similar to Cushman’s studies, Young & Saxe (2009) manipulated both outcome and belief 
information using vignettes. Agents in the scenario either had neutral or negative intentions 
and believed that they were or were not causing harm. For example, in one scenario, Grace is 
visiting a chemical plant with a friend and goes to a nearby coffee machine to get some 
coffee for her friend. Grace adds a white powder to her friend’s drink. The substance is 
labeled as “toxic” or as “sugar” leading Grace to believe the powder may or not be safe. If 
she selects the “toxic” substance, she intends to harm her friend. If she selects “sugar” then 
she has neutral intent.  This belief information is crossed with a neutral or harmful outcome, 
where the substance either is or is not harmful to Grace’s friend. The results of this study 
revealed that higher activation in the RTPJ was correlated with participants blaming Grace 
less for causing harm accidentally than participants with lower activation in this area. 
Successful harm (Grace selecting a toxic chemical that made her friend sick) was marked by 
less activation in the RTPJ, as well as greater blame. 
The reduced activation in this region when a harmful outcome is paired with harmful 
intention has been hypothesized as due to differences in the processing of accidental versus 
attempted harm. Judging an accidental act requires a robust consideration of what the agent 
knew or believed when they were acting in order to decide whether the agent should be 
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blamed for the harm they caused. However, for attempted harm there is no causal outcome 
competing with a consideration of the agent’s mental state, leading to a reduced response in 
areas associated with the inference of mental states.  
Other experiments have found similar results where the RTPJ was consistently 
selective for mental state information rather than information about other relevant social 
features of moral events such as physical traits (e.g., appearance, bodily sensations) or 
personality traits (Saxe & Powell, 2006; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). This 
consistent regional selectivity for mental state information suggests that mental states play a 
central role in moral judgment. Together these studies highlight a that (1) events and mental 
states are key inputs to moral judgment and (2) that processing these pieces of moral 
information is distinct. Given these two claims, it would be informative to consider how 
varying activities that we engage in might impact our moral judgments. More specifically, if 
we are directed to shift our attention more or less towards either event or mental state 
information, might this varying focus impact how our moral judgments develop?  Recent 
research suggests that empathy and perspective taking are such activities that may 
differentially affect how perceivers’ moral judgments turn out.  
Empathy & Perspective Taking  
Empathy is sometimes referred to broadly without regard to the specific elements that 
compose it. Empathy, however, is a multidimensional construct that has both cognitive and 
affective components. The cognitive aspects—sometimes referred to as “perspective 
taking”—are usually defined as the ability to “step outside of oneself” to recognize the 
intentions, mental states, and point of view of another person (Davis, 1980). By contrast, 
“empathy” or “empathic concern” captures the feelings and emotional response that the 
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empathizer has for another person (i.e., feeling what they feel), but not necessarily a 
consideration of the target’s point of view (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995).  
Data from studies on the neural bases of empathy suggest that perspective taking and 
affective empathy belong to different neural systems: one cognitive and one emotional 
(Batson & Moran, 1999; Davis, 1980; Decety & Cowell, 2014; Kanske, Bockler, Trautwein, 
Lesemann, & Singer, 2016; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Tuller, Bryan, Heyman, & Christenfeld, 
2015). Regions associated with perspective taking heavily overlap with areas associated with 
theory of mind and mental state inference processes, including the right and left temporal 
parietal junction (RTPJ, LTPJ), precuneus, and medial prefrontal cortex (Young et al., 2007). 
Contrastingly, regions associated with affective empathy include the anterior insula, inferior 
frontal gyrus, and the anterior cingulate cortex (Kanske et al., 2016), areas often associated 
with perceptions of the distress of others, emotional stimuli (Decety & Howard, 2013), and 
the perception of others’ pain (Decety & Jackson, 2004).  
Not only are perspective taking and empathy differently instantiated in the brain, they 
also have distinct social functions and behavioral effects. For example, perspective taking is 
more adapted to strategic social interactions (e.g., negotiations) compared to empathy. 
Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White (2008) compared the effects of perspective taking and 
empathy during a game where participants negotiated over the purchase of a property or over 
a job offer. In each scenario, a prima facie solution was not available. So, in order to succeed 
in the negotiation, participants needed to uncover any bargaining chips that might be 
available other than the stated cost. The participants were instructed to either focus on their 
own needs and strategy (control), empathize with (e.g., imagine how they feel, what are their 
emotions?), or take the perspective of their opponent (e.g., what are they thinking? What are 
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their goals in this scenario?). Of the three instructions, perspective taking was most effective 
at producing agreements that maximized both individual and collective gains. Empathizing, 
on the other hand, had no advantage over the control group, thus failing to uncover the 
specific motives and goals of their opponent that might have led to a more ideal agreement 
(Galinsky et al., 2008). 
Gilin, Maddux, Carpenter, and Galinsky (2013) conducted several studies examining 
when perspective taking or empathy are more advantageous in competitive situations. 
Perspective taking was better suited for competitive situations that required cognitive skill 
versus affective skill. For example, participants that scored high in perspective taking on the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), a scale used to measure empathy and perspective taking 
tendencies, performed better in a simulated, dyadic war game. Success in the game was 
determined by being able to infer the opponents’ goals and behavior over the course of 
several rounds.  More empathetic participants were poorer at choosing the appropriate 
strategy as well as successfully carrying them out. In a following study using a paradigm 
where people were organized into groups with the goal of building a coalition by interacting 
with group members and later “matching” with a partner, participants high in empathy were 
more successful at matching than those high in perspective taking tendencies. Accuracy in 
matching with a coalition partner was determined by partners choosing the same partner as 
them, which is facilitated by making a judgment about the interpersonal connection you 
made with your interaction partners at the start of the task. Being more empathetic, compared 
to being better at taking perspective, provided the empathizers with the emotional 
intelligence needed to be better at choosing the correct coalition partners. 
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One reason suggested for the dissimilar outcomes for perspective taking and empathy 
is that each activity focuses the observer on different types of information.  Perspective-
taking is a cognitively immersive process where the observer identifies the target’s mental 
states and considers what their experience might be like (Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2015). 
Here, the observer goes beyond mere recognition of emotion and actively tries to understand 
what the target might think or believe about the situation. The mentalizing aspects of 
perspective taking are what makes it more effective when performing tasks that require 
inferring the thoughts of others. Being empathetic, however, is more useful when attempting 
to understand the emotional states of others (e.g., building social bonds, cooperating; Gilin et 
al., 2013).  
Empathy may lead observers to attend more to moral outcomes than mental states. 
Although this has not been examined in the moral judgment literature, support for this 
prediction comes from work on moral typecasting. The theory of moral typecasting posits 
that underlying our assessment of moral event lies the perception of a moral dyad, consisting 
of a moral agent and moral patient (Gray, Young, Waytz, 2012). A moral agent is someone 
that can act autonomously and cause acts that have an effect on others. The moral patient 
experiences the effects of the agent’s actions. The emotional responsiveness that results from 
being empathetic makes us more aware of and sensitive to the presence of the moral patient, 
thus, causing outcomes to drive moral judgments more than mental states.  
Related to the current project, perspective taking has been shown to have a more 
pronounced effect on moral judgments of blame compared to empathy. Lucas, Galinsky, & 
Murhnigan (2016) had participants recall moral transgressions and categorize them based on 
malevolent or benevolent intentions and then were given instructions either to take the 
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perspective of or empathize with the perpetuator of the task. Control subjects were given 
instructions to focus on themselves. Relative to control, perspective taking amplified 
judgments of blame and punishment when the perpetrator had malevolent intent, but 
perspective taking mitigated blame relative to control when the perpetrator had neutral intent. 
Contrastingly, empathy (relative to control) did not exacerbate blame in response to agents’ 
bad intent, nor did it mitigate blame in response to innocent intent.  
Further, in a follow-up study that had participants play a dictator game where they 
were allotted funds to punish a malevolent or nonmalevolent dictator, the results were 
similar. Perspective taking led participants to spend a much greater amount of their own 
funds to punish a dictator based on his malevolent intent, above and beyond the empathy and 
self-focus group (Lucas et al., 2016). These results suggest that taking the perspective of a 
malevolent agent leads the observer to home in on this mental state information and intensify 
judgments in a way that empathy does not. Praise judgments were not examined in this study, 
but it is possible that perspective-taking and empathy could also have their own distinctive 
effects on praise judgments. This current study seeks to uncover more ground concerning 
how these two activities might factor into moral judgments of praise and blame specifically.  
Despite support for the distinct outcomes that perspective taking and empathizing can 
produce, it is worth noting the potential for perspective taking and empathizing to produce 
similar outcomes when it comes to making moral judgments. Perspective taking has been 
used as an effective way to promote or activate empathetic responses and feelings towards 
others, thus, indicating less independence between the two behaviors (Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Myers, Laurent, & Hodges, 2014).  Even though different neural 
structures are implicated in perspective taking and empathizing, due to the similarity of the 
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behaviors, there is clearly overlap in the processes associated with each, which may lead to 
similar outcomes. Many attempts have been made to try to disentangle the cognitive and 
affective components that separate perspective taking from empathy (Decety & Cowell, 
2014; Melloni, Lopez, & Ibanez, 2014). The nature of this study, its context and design may 
potentially yield similarities rather than differences between perspective taking and empathy. 
Lucas et al. (2016) had participants think of real-life moral events that they had witnessed in 
their workplace in the past. Our set of studies uses novel, third-person vignettes to examine 
moral judgments and participants will read instructions on how to empathize or take 
perspective of the individuals in the vignettes. Prior studies that have examined the effects of 
perspective taking and empathy in varying social contexts (e.g., negotiation, competitive 
interactions, first-person perspectives) may be more likely to elicit measurable differences in 
perspective taking and empathy in a way that third-person vignettes may not be able to.  
Extending from Blame to Understand Praise 
Whereas the vast majority of research and theory focuses on judgments of moral 
violations, perhaps equally important is how people evaluate morally good behavior. In part, 
this focus on moral violations and blame, in particular, derives from the power of negative 
events to command human attention and cognitive resources more powerfully than positive 
events (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Additionally, ignoring or 
misperceiving negative events is likely more costly and risky compared to making similar 
perceptual errors for positive events. 
Despite the relatively sparse treatment in the literature, several studies have 
documented a number of interesting asymmetries between judgments of blame and praise. 
Importantly, these asymmetries often correspond to how people weight information about 
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events and mental states. For example, for negative behaviors, intentional acts are reliably 
blamed more than unintentional ones (Malle & Bennett, 2002; Ohtsubo, 2007); however, this 
effect is weaker for praiseworthy behaviors.  Pizarro, Uhlmann, and Bloom (2003) observed 
a “discounting” of moral judgments of blame relative to praise. For negative behaviors, 
people discounted blame if an agent behaved impulsively or expressed behavior-inconsistent 
mental states (e.g., regret); however, perceivers did not similarly discount for positive 
behaviors. For people who exhibited positive behaviors, observers believed that these 
individuals had compatible desires (i.e., I don’t regret impulsively doing that good thing) if 
they acted impulsively, thus they did not see someone as deserving less praise for acting 
positively. Similarly, Newman, De Frietas, and Knobe (2015) found that people assigned 
more blame for negative behaviors performed intentionally versus impulsively, but praise 
judgments were constant regardless of whether behavior was intentional or impulsive. There 
is yet to be a study that examines if this asymmetry persists when observers make judgments 
after taking another person’s perspective or empathizing with them. 
The Present Studies  
Based on the prior evidence that perspective taking and empathy lead to distinct 
behavioral outcomes by focusing observers’ attention on either moral events/outcomes or an 
agent’s mental states, this set of studies examined how these activities influence moral 
judgments of blame and praise. Study 1 tested the effects of perspective taking and empathy 
on blame judgments. Study 2 attempted to replicate and extend this work by examining the 
impact of perspective taking and empathy on both judgments of blame and praise. Three key 
predictions guided these studies:  
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 (1) Perspective taking will intensify the impact of mental state information on 
judgments of blame and praise. Specifically, relative to the objective control and empathy 
conditions, perspective taking should intensify blame and praise for attempts (where agents 
have morally-relevant intentions) and mitigate blame and praise for accidents (where agents 
lack morally-relevant intentions).  
(2) Empathy will intensify the impact of outcome information on judgments of blame 
and praise. Compared to the objective control and perspective taking conditions, empathy 
should intensify blame and praise for accidents (where agents cause a morally-relevant 
outcome) and mitigate blame and praise for attempts (where agents fail to cause a morally-
relevant outcome). 
(3) Attempted acts will receive more intense moral judgments of blame and praise 
compared to accidental acts, based on prior evidence that shows that intentional acts are 
blamed more than unintentional acts.  
(4) Following from previous research (Baumeister et al., 2001), blame judgments 
should be more extreme overall compared to praise judgments.  
In addition to the main predictions, we pursued two exploratory hypotheses regarding 
(1) moral typecasting and (2) individual differences in perspective taking and empathy. Our 
first exploratory hypothesis examined whether our manipulation produced moral typecasting. 
We tested this by measuring whether participants empathized with the victim or took the 
perspective of the agent when making moral judgments. We predicted that people in the 
perspective-taking condition would indicate that they took the perspective of the agent of the 
story more than the victim. Contrastingly, we predicted that people in the empathy condition 
would indicate that they empathized with the victim of the story more than the agent.    
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Lastly, we explored whether individual differences in perspective taking and empathizing 
moderated the impact of our manipulation on people’s blame judgments. We included the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980), a measure of perspective taking and 
empathetic tendencies, so that we could test whether people’s natural tendency for 
perspective taking and empathy moderated the effect of our manipulations. We predicted that 
participants with higher perspective taking and empathy scores on the IRI would show 
stronger effects of the perspective taking and empathy manipulations respectively. The 
Institutional Review Board of Appalachian State University approved these two studies on 
November 30, 2017 (Appendix A). The procedures we used are compliant with the ethical 
standards proposed by the American Psychological Association.  
Study 1 
Participants  
We obtained 361 participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Only participants in the 
United States were able to participate. Participants were compensated $0.25 for participation. 
Sixty percent of participants were women (n = 216) and 77% identified as White (n = 290), 
8% as African American (n = 25), 7% as Asian (n = 24), 5% as Latino/Hispanic (n = 12), 2% 
as Native American (n = 3), and 1% as Middle Eastern (n = 2). For political orientation we 
collapsed scores above four as conservative, four as moderate, and scores less than four as 
liberal. Forty-five percent were liberal, 26% moderate, and 29% identified as conservative. 
Most participants responded one on the religiosity scale, with 35% indicated that they were 
not at all religious, followed by 25% that responded four on the scale, 14% responded three, 
13% responded two, and 13% responded five, indicating that they were very religious. An a 
priori power analysis with G*Power indicated that we had sufficient power to detect an effect 
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size of d = .35 with 85% power. A Cohen’s d of .35 is close to effects observed in studies 
examining differences between perspective taking an empathy. 
Design & Materials   
Study 1 used a 3 (focus: perspective-taking, empathy, objective-instruction control) x 
2 (behavior: accidental harm, attempted harm) between-subjects design with one dependent 
variable. Participants were randomly assigned to one three focus conditions: perspective-
taking, empathy, or objective-instruction control. 
In the perspective-taking condition, instructions read: “On the next screen you’re 
going to read about an interaction between two people. When you read the story, try to focus 
your attention on the thoughts and intentions of the person involved. What thoughts do you 
think were going through that person's head? Try to understand what that person believed or 
wanted.”  
Instructions in the empathy condition read: “On the next screen you’re going to read 
about an interaction between two people. When you read the story, try to focus your attention 
on the emotions and feelings of the person involved. What feelings and emotions do you 
think that person was experiencing? Try to understand what that person felt.”  
Instructions in the objective-instruction condition read “On the next screen you’re 
going to read about an interaction between two people. When you read story, try to be as 
objective as possible.”  These focus instructions were modified from Lucas et al. (2016) and 
are similar to the instructions commonly used to effectively manipulate perspective taking 
and empathy. In order to examine moral typecasting, we worded the instructions to not 
advise the participants who to empathize or perspective take with when reading the vignettes.  
After reading the instructions, particpants were then assigned to read one of two brief 
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behavior vignettes. The vignettes described either an accidental harm or an attempted harm. 
Each type of scenario was closely matched in content and length (see Appendix B). The 
vignettes read: 
Attempt: Jennifer is making a cake for her cousin’s birthday and she believes that 
her cousin is violently allergic to hazelnuts. She thinks, however, that the cake needs 
hazelnuts to taste better so she adds them anyway. Her cousin eats the cake and is 
fine.  
Accident: Jennifer is making a cake for her cousin’s birthday and she believes that 
her cousin is not allergic to hazelnuts. She thinks that the cake needs hazelnuts to 
taste better so she adds them. Her cousin eats the cake and becomes violently ill 
because of the hazelnuts.  
The main dependent variable in Study 1 was blame; after participants read the 
vignette they were asked to make a judgment on a bipolar scale (-5 a lot of blame, 0 no blame 
or praise, +5 a lot of praise). This scale is commonly used in studies measuring judgments of 
both blame and praise. This scale was selected to maintain the same scale of measurement in 
Study 2 when both judgments are measured. Next, participants were asked “Who did you 
take the perspective of/empathize with, Jennifer or her cousin?” This question examined the 
moral typecasting prediction and confirmed the target of the participants’ focus. Based on the 
prediction that perspective taking directs observers to mental states when making moral 
judgments and empathizing directs observers to event outcomes, we predicted that more 
empathizers would indicate that they attended to the moral patient and more perspective 
takers would indicate that they attended to the moral agent.  
THE EFFECTS OF PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND EMPATHY  
 
 
 
20 
Next participants were asked “Which of the following strategies did you use: 
perspective taking, being empathetic, or remaining objective?” and “Did Jennifer intend to 
harm her cousin (yes or no)?” These measures were initially meant to serve as manipulation 
checks to ensure that the participants were reading both the instructions and vignettes 
respectively, and acknowledging the agent’s intentions, however, upon analysis, “incorrect 
responses” to these measures yielded results that could be attributed to how our vignettes 
were constructed and our study design. Participants’ responses to the manipulation check 
items proved to be critical to understanding the results of the main analysis of variance. 
Because of this, we report the results with no participants excluded to avoid loss of statistical 
power and meaning. Additionally, we report the results of the manipulation check items as 
exploratory analyses because of the support the results offer in interpreting the key findings.  
Additionally, we used the IRI (Davis, 1980; see Appendix C) to measure individual 
differences in perspective taking (a = .75 for men  and  a = .78 for women) and empathic 
concern (a =.72 for men and a = .70 for women), and controlled for these variables by 
including these two subscales as covariates. The complete 28-item IRI measures individual 
differences in the five dimensions of empathy, including perspective taking, fantasy, 
empathetic concern, and personal distress (Davis, 1994). Each subscale is seven items placed 
on a 5-point scale (1 Does not describe me well, 5 Describes me very well). The scale has 
been used in other studies examining the behavioral differences in perspective taking and 
empathy. Some items include “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me” (empathy) and “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ‘other 
guy's’ point of view” (perspective taking). The participants also filled out a short 
demographics survey that asks participants for their gender, race/ethnicity, and age.  
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Procedure 
Participants on MTurk were presented with an online informed consent form. After 
giving consent, participants read the perspective taking, empathy, or objective instructions. 
After reading the instructions participants were randomly assigned to read one of the two 
behavior vignettes (accidental harm or attempted harm). They then responded to the moral 
judgment scale and to the strategy and intent manipulation check items. Based on the 
experimental instruction condition that participants were assigned to, they were asked 
specifically who they empathized or took the perspective of when reading the vignette. 
Afterwards, participants completed the IRI and demographics items. Lastly, participants were 
debriefed.  
Results 
Examining Effects on Blame 
For Study 1 we predicted that, relative to the objective control and empathy 
conditions, perspective taking should intensify blame and praise for attempts and mitigate 
blame and praise for accidents. Additionally, relative to the objective control and perspective 
taking conditions, empathy should intensify blame and praise for accidents and mitigate 
blame and praise for attempts. To examine our key predictions, we conducted a 3 (focus: 
perspective-taking, empathy, objective-instruction control) x 2 (behavior: accidental harm, 
attempted harm) between-subjects ANOVA to examine the main effects of focus and 
behavior, and the interaction effect between focus x behavior on moral judgment. The test 
revealed a main effect of behavior F(1, 355) = 32.48, p < .001, η2 = .08. Accidents were 
blamed significantly less (M = -.98, SD = 2.05) than attempts (M = -2.40, SD = 2.6). The 
effect of focus, however, was nonsignificant, F(2, 355) = 2.16, p = .116, η2 = .01. Planned 
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comparisons indicated that blame was marginally stronger in the objective condition (M        
= -2.09, SD = 2.44,) compared to the empathy (M = -1.47, SD = 2.52, p = .058), and 
perspective taking (M = -1.55, SD = 2.37, p = .094) conditions. Contrastingly, blame 
judgments in the perspective taking and empathy conditions were statistically equivalent,      
p = .810.  The behavior x focus interaction was nonsignificant F(2, 355) = .049, p = .952,    
η2 = .00.  
Scores on the empathic concern and perspective taking subscales of the IRI were 
highly correlated with each other, r = .48, p < .001, so we entered each subscale as a 
covariate into a separate ANOVA model rather than entering both covariates into a single 
model.  Controlling for perspective taking had a significant impact, F(1, 351) = 6.38,            
p = .012, η2 = .02. Scores on the perspective taking subscale impacted moral judgments such 
that as participants scored higher in their perspective taking tendencies, the greater their 
judgments of blame were. The effect of behavior remained significant, F(1,351) = 35.93,      
p < .001, η2 = .09, and the effect of focus became marginally significant, F(2,351) = 2.61,     
p = .075, η2 = .01. Controlling for empathic concern had a significant impact overall,        
F(1, 347) = 4.324, p = .038, η2 = .01. Higher scores on the empathetic concern subscale 
impacted moral judgments such that, as participants scored higher on the scale, the greater 
their judgments of blame were. The effect of behavior remained significant, F(1, 347)           
= 33.79, p < .001, η2 = .09, and the effect of focus remained nonsignificant F(2, 347) = 2.00,     
p = .137, η2 = .00.  
Exploratory Analyses: Effects on Intentionality and Focus  
We tested whether participants in the attempt and accident conditions differentially 
perceived Jennifer to be acting intentionally. A Chi-squared test, c2 (1, N = 361) = 45.17,      
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p < .001, demonstrated that the majority of participants in the accidental condition (96%) 
viewed Jennifer as not intending to harm her cousin, whereas, a small portion of participants 
(4%) saw the harm as intentional. A binomial test indicated that these proportions were 
statistically different, p < .001 (2-sided). By contrast, 31% of participants in the attempt 
condition viewed Jennifer’s behavior as intentional, compared to those who did not (69%). A 
follow-up binomial test indicated that these proportions were statistically different, p < .001 
(2-sided). 
To analyze the proportion of participants that focused on either Jennifer or Jennifer’s 
cousin when reading the vignettes, we conducted two Chi-squared tests and two-sided 
binomial analyses. This information was recorded for participants that were given either 
perspective taking focus instructions or empathy focus instructions (see Figure 1). In the 
empathy focus condition, there were significant differences in who participants empathized 
with based on the type of vignette they read, c2 (1, N = 118) = 12.47, p < .001.  When 
participants read the accidental vignette, equal numbers empathized with Jennifer (59%) 
compared to her cousin (41%), p = .193. Contrastingly, when participants read about 
attempts, the majority of participants empathized with Jennifer’s cousin (73%) compared to 
Jennifer (27%), p = .001. Opposite patterns emerged for perspective taking. Participants 
differentially took the perspective of Jennifer versus her cousin based on the behavior that 
took place, c2 (1, N = 122) = 18.31, p < .001. When reading about accidental harms, 
significantly more participants took Jennifer’s perspective (80%) compared to her cousin 
(20%), p < .001. Contrastingly, when reading about attempted harm, equal proportions of 
participants took Jennifer’s (43%) and her cousin’s (57%) perspective, p = .306. 
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Discussion 
Although the main predictions were not supported, the results of Study 1 do support 
previous work demonstrating that attempts are blamed more harshly than accidents (Chakroff 
& Young, 2015; Cushman, 2008). Additionally, whereas the effects of empathy and 
perspective taking were not differentiated, both conditions showed a marginally significant 
difference from the objective condition.  Participants instructed to remain objective blamed 
more strongly compared to participants in either the perspective taking or empathy 
conditions. This suggests that engaging in either perspective taking or empathizing may lead 
observers to give more “credit” to agents, reducing blame overall. Alternatively, instructing 
participants to remain objective may actually amplify moral judgments, as being objective 
may not be people’s default means of evaluating a moral situation.   
The responses to the question about the agent’s intent, although surprising, are in line 
with evidence regarding how intentionality is assessed. Participants may have been inclined 
to see the attempted act as less intentional because Jennifer’s cousin did not get sick; the lack 
of culpable outcome may have reduced the overall perception of intentionality (Malle & 
Bennett, 2002; Pizarro et al., 2003). Additionally, participants may have been puzzled by this 
outcome since the vignette did not explicitly indicate that Jennifer wanted and believed (two 
key components of intent, see Malle & Knobe, 1997) her actions would cause harm; 
participants may have viewed Jennifer as negligent or indifferent to the possible harmful 
outcome.  
Regarding the moral typecasting prediction, we initially predicted that for both 
accidents and attempts, those in the empathy condition would be sensitive to attending to 
Jennifer’s cousin since she is/or could potentially be harmed; those in the perspective taking 
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condition would pay more attention to Jennifer, the agent, to identify mental state 
information.  There was some support for this hypothesis. For accidents, perspective takers 
attended to Jennifer significantly more than Jennifer’s cousin and they blamed the least 
compared to remaining objective and empathizing. This finding suggests that information 
about an agent’s mental state may have factored into mitigating the blame judgment more 
than the outcome did for perspective takers. Fifty-nine percent of empathizers attended to 
Jennifer and the rest attended to her cousin, but these differences were not statistically 
different. For the attempted act, we obtained results in the opposite direction. As predicted, 
most empathizers (73%) stated that they attended to Jennifer’s cousin, which was 
significantly greater than those who attended to Jennifer. Perspective takers were roughly 
equivalent in who they attended to, with 57% attending to Jennifer’s cousin. Paired with the 
finding that only a small percentage of participants saw the attempted act of harm as 
intentional, the data may reflect that because Jennifer is acting in an undesirable way 
(unconcerned about her cousin’s allergy), participants are reluctant to engage with her. 
Regardless of her cousin not being harmed, participants are more sensitive to Jennifer’s 
cousin’s experience when they are being empathetic, as predicted.  
Study 2 
Study 2 was intended to expand on the findings of Study 1 and test to determine if a 
differential pattern of moral judgments arises for judgments of praise. Based on the prior 
evidence that shows that praiseworthy acts are evaluated less intensely than blameworthy 
acts (Newman et al., 2015; Pizarro, Uhlmann & Bloom, 2003), I predicted that judgments of 
praise for both attempts and accidents will exhibit a similar pattern of results, where empathy 
intensifies the judgment of accidents and perspective taking intensifies the judgment of 
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attempts; however, praise was predicted to produce judgments of lower magnitude relative to 
blame.  
Participants  
We obtained 361 participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants that 
participated in Study 1 were prevented from signing up for this study and only participants in 
the United States were permitted. Participants were compensated $0.25 for compensation. 
Sixty-three percent of participants were women (n = 226) and 78% identified as White (n     
= 280), 7% as African American (n = 26), 8% as Asian (n = 34), 4% as Latino/Hispanic (n   
= 15), 1% as Native American (n = 2), and 1% as Middle Eastern (n = 3).  For political 
orientation we collapsed scores above four as conservative, four as moderate, and scores less 
than four as liberal. Forty-six percent were liberal, 26% moderate, and 28% identified as 
conservative. Most participants responded one on the religiosity scale, with 35% indicated 
that they were not at all religious, followed by 19% that responded four on the scale, 16% 
responded three, 19% responded two, and 11% responded five, indicating that they were very 
religious. The average age of the sample was 38.42 (SD = 12.47).  A power analysis with 
G*Power indicated that we had sufficient power to detect an effect size of d = .35 with 85%  
power.  
Design and Procedure 
This study used a 2 (story valence: praise, blame) x 3 (focus: perspective-taking, 
empathy, objective instruction control) x 2 (behavior: accident, attempted) mixed design with 
story valence manipulated within-subjects, and focus and behavior manipulated between-
subjects. After consenting to participate in the study, participants were assigned to read one 
of the three focus instructions (identical to Study 1) and then read one of two vignettes (an 
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accidental help/harm, or an attempted help/harm). We counterbalanced the order of the 
praiseworthy and blameworthy behaviors, and matched the vignettes so participants only 
receive one level of the behavior manipulation.  For example, if a participant read about an 
attempted harm, s/he also read about an attempted helpful behavior. The same blameworthy 
vignettes from Study 1 were used in this study (see Appendix B). An example of the 
praiseworthy vignettes are as follows: 
Attempt: Jennifer is making her cousin’s favorite cake for her birthday. She sets the 
oven to preheat, believing that it is on, and she places the cake in the oven to bake.  A 
little while later, her cousin arrives, and Jennifer takes the cake out to discover that 
the oven is broken and the cake never baked.    
Accident: Jennifer is making a cake for herself. She sets the oven to preheat, and she 
places the cake in the oven to bake.  A little while later, her cousin arrives, Jennifer 
realizes suddenly that it is her cousin’s birthday. The cake she baked happens to be 
her cousin’s favorite, so her cousin assumes the cake was made just for her; they sit 
down and eat the cake together. 
The focus instructions were given before reading each vignette. After reading each vignette, 
participants responded to the moral judgment item. For the both the praise and blame 
vignettes, participants were asked how much blame or praise the agent of the story deserves 
(-5 a lot of blame, 0 no blame or praise, +5 a lot of praise). Participants then responded to the 
strategy and manipulation check items. Depending on the experimental instruction condition 
that participants were assigned to, they were asked specifically who they empathized or took 
the perspective of when reading the vignette. As in Study 1, responses to this question were 
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treated as supporting exploratory analyses rather than manipulation checks. Then participants 
completed the IRI, the demographic questionnaire, and were debriefed.  
Results 
We predicted that Study 2 would replicate the results of Study 1. The only predicted 
difference was that judgments of blame would be more intense overall than judgments of 
praise. The results of Study 2 were surprising in that a majority of the moral judgment scores 
were negatively valenced, indicating that participants evaluated our praiseworthy scenarios 
as blameworthy. Because of this, the dependent variable of interest for these analyses will be 
judgments of blame unless stated otherwise.  
Effects on Blame and Praise  
We conducted a three-way analysis of variance with the behavior (accident vs. 
attempt) and focus (perspective taking, empathy, or objective) factors as between-subjects 
variables and the valence factor (praise vs. blame) as a within-subjects variable to test the 
main predictions.  The analysis revealed that the predicted three-way interaction was 
marginally significant, F(2, 355 ) = 2.702, p = .068, η2 = .015. The main effect of valence 
was significant, F(1, 355) = 4.54, p = .034, η2 = .012. The praiseworthy vignettes received a 
greater amount of blame (M = -.95, SD = 2.62) than the blameworthy vignettes (M = -.50,  
SD = 2.56). All other main effects and interactions were not significant (Fs < 1.02,               
ps > .310). We therefore decomposed the three-way interaction into two 3 (focus) x 2 
(behavior) between-subjects ANOVAs (one ANOVA for each behavior valence).  One model 
assessed moral judgments about the blameworthy vignettes and the other model assessed 
moral judgments about the praiseworthy vignettes.  
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The ANOVA for blameworthy behaviors revealed a significant main effect of focus, 
F(2,355) = 10.15, p <.001, η2 = .053 (see Figure 3). On average, those in the objective 
condition evaluated the blameworthy scenarios as being somewhat praiseworthy (M = 0.32, 
SD = 2.23). Judgments in the objective condition were significantly more positive than moral 
judgments in the perspective taking (M = -0.79, SD = 2.41, p = .001) and empathy conditions 
(M = -1.03, SD = 2.81, p < .001); whereas, the empathy and perspective taking conditions 
produce equivalent amounts of blame (p = .471).  There was also a significant main effect of 
behavior F(1, 355) = 7.31, p =.007, η2 = .02. Replicating Study 1, we found that accidents  
(M = -0.15, SD = 2.34) were blamed less than attempts (M = -0.86, SD = 2.71). The focus x 
behavior interaction was not significant, F(2, 355) = 3.28, p = .586, η2 = .003.   
Planned comparisons demonstrated that although the interaction was not significant, 
the pattern of results were in line with our predictions. Descriptively, participants in the 
empathy condition (M = -0.75, SD = 2.83) blamed accidental harm significantly more than 
those in the objective condition (M = 0.55, SD = 2.02, p = .005). People in the empathy 
condition also blamed more than those in the perspective taking condition (M = -0.26,        
SD = 1.94), but this difference was nonsignificant (p = .279). Perspective takers blamed 
marginally more than those who remained objective (p = .072).  For attempted behaviors, 
perspective taking (M = -1.34, SD = .322) produced a greater amount of blame than those in 
the empathy (M = -1.31, SD = 0.32, p =.952) and objective condition (M = 0.08, SD = 0.32,  
p =.002). This effect, however, was only significantly different from those in the objective 
condition.  
The praiseworthy ANOVA revealed the predicted significant interaction of focus x 
behavior, F(2, 355) = 11.24, p < .001, η2= .06 (see Figure 4). Additionally, there was a main 
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effect of focus, F(2, 355) = 13.72, p < .001, η 2 = .068, though the effect of behavior was 
nonsignificant, F(1,355) = 1.103, p = .294, η2 = .003. Planned comparisons demonstrated that 
for accidents, being objective (M = -0.20, SD = 2.27) produced significantly less blame than 
the empathy condition (M = -2.36, SD = 2.60, p < .001), but an equivalent amount of blame 
as the perspective taking condition (M = 0.08, SD = 2.11, p = .530). Empathy produced 
significantly more blame than those in the perspective taking condition (p < .001).  For 
attempts, the objective (M = - 0.15, SD = 2.19) condition produced significantly less blame 
than both the empathy (M = -1.31, SD = 2.90, p = .010) and perspective taking conditions   
(M = -1.83, SD = 2.64, p < .001). Perspective taking produced more blame than the empathy 
condition, but this effect was nonsignificant (p = .249). 
Next, we tested to see if controlling for scores on the PT and EC subscales impacted 
moral judgments. As in Study 1, the perspective taking and empathy subscales were highly 
correlated with one another (r = .50, p < .001), so we entered each subscale into a separate 
model to examine the impact of individual differences on moral judgments. The PT subscale 
had a significant effect on the model, F(1,353) = 4.055, p = .045, η2= .020, such that as 
scores on the PT subscale increase, moral judgments become more negative (blameworthy).  
The EC concern was also nonsignificant, F(1,347 ) = .008, p = .930, η2 = .00.  
Exploratory Analyses: Effects on Intentionality Judgments 
Lastly, we tested whether participants in the attempt and accident conditions 
differentially perceived Jennifer to be acting intentionally. First, when evaluating our 
blameworthy vignettes, a Chi-squared test demonstrated that the majority of participants 
(69%) evaluating the accidental vignettes viewed Jennifer as not intending to harm her 
cousin, whereas, a small portion of participants (31%) saw the harm as intentional, c2 (1,      
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n = 360) = 9.16, p = .003. A binomial test indicated that these proportions were statistically 
different, p < .001 (2-sided). By contrast, 47% of participants in the attempt condition viewed 
Jennifer’s behavior as intentional, compared to those who did not (53%). A binomial test 
indicated that these proportions were not statistically different, p = .412 (2-sided).  
When evaluating praiseworthy vignettes, a Chi-squared test demonstrated that the 
majority of participants in the accidental condition (73%) viewed Jennifer as not intending to 
harm her cousin, whereas, a small portion of participants (27%) saw the harm as intentional, 
c2 (1, N = 360) = 11.23, p < .001. A follow-up binomial test indicated that these proportions 
were statistically different, p < .001 (2-sided). By contrast, 43% of participants in the attempt 
condition viewed Jennifer’s behavior as intentional, compared to those who did not (57%). A 
follow-up binomial test indicated that these proportions were marginally different, p = .086 
(2-sided).1  
Discussion 
Study 2 produced several patterns of findings that diverged from Study 1.  
Importantly, one distinction of Study 2 is that the overall pattern of results fit more closely 
with our initial predictions. Perspective taking and empathy produced harsher judgments of 
blame relative to being objective. This pattern also appears for our praiseworthy vignettes. 
Additionally, blame for accidental acts was highest for those empathizing with the persons in 
the vignettes and blame or attempts was highest for perspective takers. Curiously, these 
effects were most prominent for our praiseworthy vignette rather than our blameworthy 
vignettes.  
                                                        
1 Due to an error in data collection for Study 2, we are unable to report who participants in 
both the empathy and perspective taking conditions focused on when reading each vignette.  
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After re-evaluating our vignettes, we identified some possibilities for why 
participants saw these judgments as not praiseworthy. In our attempted act of harm, Jennifer 
may be seen as responsible for performing an important birthday task (i.e., baking a cake), 
and failing to turn on the oven may indicate a morally-blameworthy disregard for this 
responsibility and her cousin’s feelings overall. Our vignettes may not have conveyed 
praiseworthy intent clearly or reflected a willingness to carry out the praiseworthy outcome. 
Whereas for our accidental case, participants who were instructed to empathize may have 
been sensitive to perceiving deception: Jennifer not only forgot her cousin’s birthday, but 
then passed the cake that she made for herself off as a gift. This would explain why 
empathizers are blaming the most for this behavior but perspective takers are somewhat 
neutral in their judgments. Perspective taking may lead observers to focus more on the agent, 
less on the patient and credit the agent if harmful intent is not apparent. Empathizing 
amplifying blame for the accidents on the basis of the moral patient who appears to be 
getting deceive by a family member.  
General Discussion  
Two studies examined how perspective taking and empathizing affect moral 
judgments of blame and praise. We had four central hypotheses for our studies.  First, 
following from the theory of moral typecasting (Gray et al., 2012), we predicted that 
perspective taking would intensify judgments of blame and praise for attempted acts, because 
perspective taking would focus perceivers on the agent’s intent to harm or benefit another 
person. Second, we predicted that empathizing would intensify judgments of blame and 
praise for accidents because empathy would focus perceivers on the suffering of the moral 
patient. Third, consistent with previous research in moral psychology (Cushman, 2008; 
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Young & Saxe, 2009), we predicted that moral judgment of blame and praise would be more 
extreme in response to attempts compared to accidents. Lastly, we predicted that compared to 
judgments of blame, judgments of praise would be less extreme.  
Taken together, the results of the present studies provide some evidence in support of 
our hypotheses. Consistent with our third prediction, we observed greater blame for 
attempted actions relative to accidents for both studies.  This is consistent with past research 
(Cushman, 2008; Young & Saxe, 2009) and demonstrates that malevolent intention (even 
without actual harm) produces harsher judgments of blame than actually harming another 
person accidentally. However, evidence for our first and second hypotheses were more 
mixed. In Study 1, we did not observe meaningful differences in judgments of blame 
between our perspective taking, empathy, and objective instructions. Regardless of the 
instructions given, participants evenly blamed for accidents and attempts.  
In Study 2, we observed meaningful differences in the outcomes that each type of 
instructions produced, however, the results did not replicate our findings from Study 1. Even 
though we used the same blameworthy vignettes across both studies the pattern of blame 
reversed in the second study. The objective instructions yielded somewhat neutral judgments 
that were surprisingly slightly positively valenced instead of negatively valenced as we 
predicted. Unlike in Study 1, in Study 2, perspective taking and empathy both produced 
greater blame than in the objective condition. The most puzzling finding of Study 2 was the 
pattern of moral judgments we observed for our praiseworthy vignettes, which were not 
judged as being praiseworthy. Despite not receiving praise, the pattern of results were in line 
with our prediction that empathizing would lead to increased judgments of blame for 
accidents, and perspective taking would lead to reduced amounts of blame for accidents. Due 
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to participants generally not rating our vignettes as praiseworthy, we were not able to 
evaluate the intensity of judgments of praise versus judgments of blame.  
Responses to our Study 1 exploratory items allowed us to further interpret how 
people perceived the intentionality of our vignettes, as well who people focused on when 
reading the vignettes. The results of these items somewhat affirm that perspective taking or 
empathizing when evaluating a moral event, paired with varying levels of intentionality (i.e., 
accidents and attempts), can lead observers to focus differently on the individuals involved in 
the moral event. This coincides with our moral typecasting prediction as well as prior work in 
this area (Gray & Wegner, 2008; Schein & Gray, 2014). An area for future studies would be 
to look more deeply at how focusing more or less on either the agent or victim involved in a 
moral event impacts moral judgments and how they are formed. Additionally, what features 
of moral events leads observers to pay more attention to either person.  
The most consistent finding was that in Study 2 empathy amplified judgments of 
blame beyond perspective taking and being objective for both valences of vignette. This 
effect held up when we analyzed participants who responded correctly to our intent 
manipulation check items. Participants who read both our accidental blameworthy and 
praiseworthy vignettes as unintentional, the pattern blame was as predicted, with empathy 
significantly intensifying blame for accidents beyond perspective taking and being objective. 
Perspective taking produced significantly more blame than being objective. However, due to 
the small group size when omitting incorrect manipulation check items, we refrain from 
making broad assumptions from the data.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
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Vignette influence on observed moral judgments. One explanation for the differing 
results for Studies 1 and 2 may be attributed to features of the vignettes. One issue is that 
participants may have attributed negative traits to our moral agent when reading about 
Jennifer’s failed attempt at baking a cake for her cousin’s birthday (i.e., negligence, 
irresponsible), thus, leading the vignette to seem more blameworthy instead of praiseworthy. 
A way to resolve this issue would be to create longer vignettes that detail the agent’s 
character more clearly and convey intentionality more strongly, so that participants do not fill 
in traits about the agents due to a lack of information about their character. In real life, if we 
were to witness such an attempt we might be indifferent to the situation if we knew nothing 
else about Jennifer’s character.  
An alternative explanation is that praise is predominantly reliant on the outcomes of 
an action, such that attempting to cause a praiseworthy outcome and failing is more likely to 
produce a neutral response rather than a praiseworthy response.  Another possibility is that 
praise judgments are critically reliant on both outcomes and an intentional mental state, thus 
making accidental acts of praise seem odd and incomplete. Praise might stem from the 
realization that someone caused a positive outcome and intended to do so. Our accidental 
case, may have been seen as blameworthy on account of participants inferring that Jennifer 
ultimately is lying by omission. She makes a cake for herself but then appears to let her 
cousin believe that she made the case for her birthday.  
If participants are evaluating both vignettes as somewhat blameworthy and are filling 
in character information about Jennifer in the first vignette they read, then this may have 
affected moral judgments in the second vignette, which might explain why judgments about 
our blameworthy vignettes did not replicate judgments made about them in Study 1. This 
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possibility could have been prevented by using a different set of names for each vignette. 
Additionally, it may be have been preferable to use characters that were not related to one 
another. Participants could have seen each act as less praiseworthy because some amount of 
irresponsibility or deception was involved in either scenario. Sensitivity to these negative 
qualities may have been heighted based on the mere fact that the characters are related and 
Jenifer may have had a duty to be more honest with her cousin or to ensure that her birthday 
cake is baked. Overall, pretesting vignettes is a necessary step, as is perhaps asking 
participants to indicate why they made a particular moral judgment afterwards.  
Isolating the impact of empathy and perspective taking. One thing that is still 
unclear is how our instructions affected the directionality of people’s moral judgments. Is 
empathy intensifying blame for accidents or is it that perspective taking and being objective 
are actually mitigating blame? One reason to believe that perspective taking is reducing 
blame for accidents may be that it is a more effortful and controlled process than empathizing 
is (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Empathizing may be producing a more immediate moral 
judgment, whereas perspective taking arrives at a more reasoned judgment as the observer 
attempts to examine the situation in a less emotionally reactive way, thus reducing blame 
after considering the agent’s mental state. In the moral judgment literature, accidents have 
been shown to be cognitively challenging events that “require overriding a pre-potent 
response to an emotionally salient outcome” (Young & Tsoi, 2013, p. 588). If this is the case, 
then it may partially suggest that perspective taking and being objective work in similar 
ways. Both behaviors may require an inhibition of emotional responding to the harmful 
outcome to arrive at a final moral judgment. Future studies that include a “no instruction” 
control condition could disentangle these two explanations. Additionally, perspective-taking 
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and empathizing my not produce distinct behavioral outcomes in all social situations. Our 
instructions or vignettes may not have created the engagement needed to produced distinct 
effects. On the other hand, it could be the case that when it comes to moral judgment 
perspective taking and empathy may produce very similar effects regardless of the moral 
scenario and that is somewhat supported  by our findings.  
Conclusion 
Although we obtained mixed results, the evidence from this set of studies seems to 
support the claim that empathizing and perspective taking can have varying effects on moral 
judgments. Specifically, both behaviors appear to be differently impacted by morally relevant 
features such as agent intentionality and event outcomes. As evidenced by our individual 
differences measures, being more oriented towards perspective taking or empathizing may 
work to intensify the differential effects of either behavior, thus leading to greater moral 
judgments of praise or blame.   
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Figure 1. Who participants focused on when reading about accidental and attempted harm 
based on the instructions in Study 1. 
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Figure 2. Moral judgment mean ratings for blameworthy vignettes in Study 2.   
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Figure 3. Moral judgment mean ratings for praiseworthy vignettes in Study 2.  
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Appendix A 
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Appendix B 
Instructions & Vignette Stimuli  
Perspective taking instructions:  
On the next screen, you’re going to read about an interaction between two people. When you 
read story try to focus your attention on the thoughts and intentions of the person involved. 
What thoughts do you think were going through that person's head? Try to understand what 
that person believed or wanted. 
 
Empathy instructions:  
On the next screen, you’re going to read about an interaction between two people. When you 
read story try to focus your attention on the emotions and feelings of the person involved. 
What feelings and emotions do you think that person was experiencing? Try to understand 
what that person felt or experienced. 
 (Modified from: Lucas, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2016) 
 
Objective instruction:  
On the next screen, you’re going to read about an interaction between two people. When you 
read story try to be as objective as possible. 
 
Blameworthy Scenarios:  
Attempt- Jennifer is making a cake for her cousin’s birthday and she believes that her cousin 
is violently allergic to hazelnuts. She thinks, however, that the cake needs hazelnuts to taste 
better so she adds them anyway. Her cousin eats the cake and is fine.  
Accident- Jennifer is making a cake for her cousin’s birthday and she believes that her 
cousin is not allergic to hazelnuts. She thinks that the cake needs hazelnuts to taste better so 
she adds them. Her cousin eats the cake and becomes violently ill because of the hazelnuts.  
 
Praiseworthy Scenarios:   
Attempt- Jennifer is making her cousin’s favorite cake for her birthday. She sets the oven to 
preheat, believing that it is on, and she places the cake in the oven to bake.  A little while 
later, her cousin arrives, and Jennifer takes the cake out to discover that the oven is broken 
and the cake never baked.    
Accident- Jennifer is making a cake for herself. She sets the oven to preheat, and she places 
the cake in the oven to bake.  A little while later, her cousin arrives, Jennifer realizes 
suddenly that it is her cousin’s birthday. The cake she baked happens to be her cousin’s 
favorite, so her cousin assumes the cake was made just for her; they sit down and eat the 
cake together. 
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Appendix C 
 
INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations.  
For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on the  
scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you have decided on your answer, fill in 
the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY 
BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as honestly as you can.  Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
 
 A               B               C               D               E 
 DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
 DESCRIBE ME                                                 VERY 
 WELL                                                             WELL 
 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
(FS) 
 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 
 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT) (-) 
 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (EC) (-
) 
 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS) 
 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 
 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it. (FS) (-) 
 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
(EC) 
 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. (PD) 
 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
      perspective. (PT) 
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12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. (FS) (-) 
 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-) 
 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) 
 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
      arguments. (PT) (-) 
 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (FS) 
 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD) 
 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them.  
      (EC) (-) 
 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-) 
 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 
 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
       character. (FS) 
 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD) 
 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. (PT) 
 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. (FS) 
 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD) 
 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(PT) 
 
 
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
  PT = perspective-taking scale 
  FS = fantasy scale 
  EC = empathic concern scale 
  PD = personal distress scale 
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  A = 0 
  B = 1 
  C = 2 
  D = 3 
  E = 4 
 
Except for reversed-scored items, which are scored: 
 
  A = 4 
  B = 3 
  C = 2 
  D = 1 
  E = 0 
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. 
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